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THE SUPREME COURT'S HEIGHTENED REVIEW 
OF LAND USE EXACTIONS IN 
DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD 
by Lynda L. ButlerO 
On June 24, 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided Dolan v. City of Tigard, a 
case with potentially farreaching consequences for exactions and other land use regulations. 62 
U.S.L.W. 4576 (June 24, 1994). In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed and remanded an Oregon 
Supreme Court decision upholding conditions requiring the applicants of a building permit to 
dedicate portions of their land for a public greenway to minimize flooding and for a 
pedestrianlbicycle path to relieve traffic congestion. 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 62 U.S.L.W. 
4576 (June 24, 1994). The landowners in Dolan had applied for a permit to expand their 
commercial use of the land. [d. at 438. In reversing the Oregon Supreme Court decision to 
uphold the permit conditions, the United States Supreme Court held that the city did not meet 
its burden under takings law of demonstrating "the required degree of connection between the 
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development." 62 U.S.L.W. at 4579,4581. 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth a two-part test for evaluating 
the legitimacy of the permit conditions under the takings principles of the United States 
Constitution. First, the Court must "determine whether the 'essential nexus ' exists between the 
' legitimate state interest' and the permit condition exacted by the city." [d. at 4579. If the Court 
finds that this nexus exists, then it must decide whether the "required degree of connection" exists 
"between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development." [d. According 
to the majority, the phrase "'rough proportionality' best encapsulates ll what is necessary under 
this second part of the test and is close to the "reasonable relationship" test already adopted by 
a majority of state courts. [d. at 4580. The Court further explained that its "rough 
proportionality" standard did not require a "precise mathematical calculation," but it did mean 
that the city had to "make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication 
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development." Id. [footnote 
omitted]. 
In announcing the second part of its takings test, the Court recognized that it was going 
beyond its decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). As 
Rehnquist explained, the Court resolved the dispute in Nollan on the basis of the essential nexus 
standard, concluding that not even the loosest nexus standard was met in Nollan. Dolan, 62 
U.S.L.W. at 4579. The Nollan Court therefore did not have to reach the second level of inquiry 
about the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the 
proposed development. That second level of inquiry, by contrast, was critical to the resolution 
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of Dolan. It forced the Court to focus more precisely on the distinction between a valid exercise 
of the police power and an invalid exercise of eminent domain, asking whether, in the case 
before it, there was a sufficient connection between the permit conditions and the adverse effects 
of the proposed development. See id. at 4580. 
In applying the first part of its test, the Court quickly found that the permit conditions met 
the essential nexus standard. The Court explained that the prevention of flooding and the 
reduction of traffic congestion qualified as legitimate public purposes and that an essential nexus 
existed between those public interests and the permit conditions. The nexus existed between the 
public interest of flood prevention and the condition limiting development within the floodplain 
(by requiring dedication of greenway space) because the proposed development would expand 
the impervious surface on the property and therefore increase stormwater run-off into the nearby 
creek. Furthermore, providing for alternative means of transportation (through the dedication of 
a pedestrianlbicycle pathway) would reduce traffic congestion by removing potential vehicles 
from the roads. [d. at 4579. 
The permit conditions did not, however, meet the rough proportionality standard. 
Although the Court acknowledged that keeping the floodplain free from development would limit 
the pressures of the proposed development on the nearby creek, the Court did not understand how 
this fact justified the requirement that the landowner dedicate land in the floodplain to the public. 
Requiring a private greenway also would have furthered the public interest of flood prevention, 
but would have differed in one significant respect from the public greenway dedication 
requirement: the landowner would have retained the right to exclude, one of the most 
fundamental rights of property owners. Had the proposed development encroached on an existing 
public greenway, the city could have required the landowner to provide alternative greenway 
space for the public. But since such a situation did not exist in Dolan, the Court concluded that 
the city had failed to show the "required reasonable relationship" between the floodplain easement 
requirement and the proposed development. [d. at 4581. 
The pedestrianlbicycle pathway requirement also did not have the required degree of 
connection to the proposed development. The Court recognized, as a preliminary matter, that 
"[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid 
excessive congestion from a proposed property use." ld. In this particular case, however, the 
city had not met its burden of "demonstrating that the additional number of vehicles and bicycle 
trips generated by the ... [proposed] development reasonably relate to the city's requirement for 
a dedication of the pedestrianlbicycle pathway easement." ld. The city had simply found that 
the pathway "'could offset some of the traffic demand.'" ld. To meet its burden, the city must 
provide some quantitative evidence to support its finding. 
Besides imposing what appears to be a new requirement to measure the degree of 
connection between a condition and the impacts of a proposed development, the decision in 
Dolan also represents a clear shift in the allocation of the burden of proof from the landowner 
to government in at least some exaction cases. In evaluating land use regulations affecting 
economic interests in property, the Court traditionally has accorded government a presumption 
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of constitutional validity. See id. at 4583-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting); MANDElKER DANIEL R., 
JULES B. GERARD & E. THOMAS SUU.JVAN, FEDERAL LAND USE l...A.w § 1.03 (1986 & Release 
#1, Feb. 1988) & § 6.06 (Release #4, Feb. 1991). The majority opinion in Dolan clearly denies 
the legitimacy of this presumption at least in those land use cases involving an adjudicative 
decision affecting a particular property owner - as opposed to land use cases involving generally 
applicable zoning regulations. 62 U.S.L.W. at 4580 n.8 (majority opinion). Instead, in those 
adjudicative cases, government bears the burden of justifying the exaction imposed on a particular 
tract of land by showing a rough proportionality between the exaction and the impacts of the 
proposed development. To meet this burden, government must demonstrate that it "ma[d]e some 
effort to quantify its findings" in support of the condition imposed on the particular landowner. 
Id.at 4581. Before Nolan, government generally had not been required to make such an 
individualized determination to justify economic regulation under the due process or takings 
clauses of the federal Constitution. 
Justice Rehnquist provided two potentially important ways to distinguish and limit Dolan. 
In setting the stage for the articulation of the two-part test, Rehnquist stressed that Dolan differed 
from many of the Court's other takings decisions. First, Dolan was different because it involved 
an adjudicative decision to condition a permit application on an individual parcel; other cases, 
in contrast, involved challenges to "essentially legislative determinations" having general 
applicability. Id. at 4578. Second, the permit conditions in Dolan required the landowner to 
"deed portions of the property to the city" and did not simply limit the property's use. Id. The 
Court recognized that in cases lacking these two elements a land use regulation generally is valid 
under the takings clause if it substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not deny 
an owner economically viable use. Id. 
While Rehnquist's discussion of Dolan's distinguishing factors suggests that Dolan will 
have limited impact, the Court's subsequent action in vacating a California decision and 
remanding it for reconsideration in light of Dolan suggests otherwise. In that decision the owner 
of an unsuccessful private tennis club proposed to demolish the club and build townhouses 
instead. The city was willing to allow the change in use if the property owner paid an amount 
to mitigate the loss of recreational facilities, as well as an art fee to offset the opportunity for the 
creation of cultural and artistic assets lost because of development. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver 
City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (1993), vacated, 114 S.O. 2731 (1994). The Court's action suggests 
that many land use regulatory decisions could now fall within the scope of Dolan. As long as 
a landowner is challenging how a regulation has been applied and as long as the regulatory 
process involved a compromise allowing development if certain conditions were met, the 
challenge would appear to involve the type of adjudicative decision identified by Rehnquist as 
his first distinguishing factor. Further, the Court's vacation of the California decision suggests 
that the second distinguishing factor - the deeding of property - may not be necessary. 
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